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MOCKINGBIRD: 
A LOGICAL METHODOLOGY FOR TESTING 
MICHAEL M. GORLICK, CARL F. KESSELMAN, 
DANIEL A. MAROTTA, AND D. STOTT PARKER 
D Mockingbird is a testing methodology founded on a formal specification of 
the test space. The specification is executable and bidirectional. When run 
in one direction it acts as a generator, producing tests whose properties 
conform to the specification. When run in the opposite direction it acts as 
an acceptor, validating tests against the specification. The specification 
language is a combination of context-free grammars and constraint systems. 
The semantics of the specification are based on constraint logic program- 
ming. This paper describes the philosophy, design, and implementation of 
Mockingbird and its use in testing a large, complex system. a 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A central problem of testing is the construction of test data sets that incisively 
reveal errors in the system under test [8,16,34,40]. Building complete and reliable 
test sets is difficult. As the range, form, and complexity of software increase, so does 
the extent of the testing problems. 
An example of these testing problems can be found in communication protocols. 
For example, IP/TCP (Internet Protocol/Transmission Control Protocol) is a proto- 
col suite that allows intercommunication between heterogeneous systems [15]. With 
over a hundred implementations, testing to ensure conformance to the protocol 
standard is a significant issue. New implementations of IP/TCP are often incompati- 
ble with older “benchmark” implementations. Many times protocol errors are not 
discovered until the implementation is in use on site. It is tempting to speculate how 
many of these errors might be uncovered earlier if suitable protocol testing tools 
were available. 
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Since communication protocols are amenable to grammatical description, gram- 
mars are a natural specification language for describing their test space. Others 
concerned with software testing, particularly those interested in compiler validation, 
have used grammars similarly [2-4,10,12,18,32]. Since the space of all possible 
messages is enormous for even a simple protocol, exhaustive testing is infeasible. 
Successful testing depends on a systematic search of the test space specified by a 
grammar. 
A specification that describes both the structure and semantics of a protocol can 
be an aid in the search of the test space [33]. Moreover, an executable specification 
is a standard against which the behavior of the implementation can be judged. If we 
could run the specification “backwards,” it would produce messages rather that 
consume them. These generated messages could then be used as test inputs for the 
working system. 
Logic programming has long been recognized as a superb medium for grammars 
and parsers [5,6]. A well-known curiosity of the culture of logic programming is the 
observation that, with care, the grammar rules composing the parser can be run 
“backwards” to generate sentences of the language [37]. The ability of logic 
grammars to act as either acceptors or generators can be exploited to produce 
executable specifications for the validation and generation of software tests. 
This paper describes Mockingbird, a methodology for designing and creating 
tests. Based on reversible logic grammars, Mockingbird provides the test engineer 
with a formalism for developing and implementing a testing program. Mockingbird 
does not design or choose a testing policy; rather, it allows for a clear, concise 
description of a family of tests, distinguished by one or more common properties. 
Moreover, members of the family can be automatically generated from their 
description. Mockingbird was originally developed for testing a subdomain of 
communication protocols known as messageJilters. A message filter is an intermedi- 
ary in a communications path-an agent that permits only those messages meeting 
specified criteria to pass. Message filters are described more fully in Section 6. 
The semantics and techniques of logic programming are reflected throughout 
Mockingbird. The methodology is based on a declarative logical semantics and, 
when mediated by a compiler technology common to PROLOG implementations, 
yields an efficient, executable specification. The system and supporting tools, them- 
selves implemented in PROLOG, may be applied throughout the life cycle of the 
protocol, from initial design to regression testing. 
Mockingbird is based on constraint logic programming (CLP) [21], a generaliza- 
tion of logic programming. This enables Mockingbird to transform loosely specified 
test requirements into a form usable for testing. We feel this approach anticipates 
future programming systems: one should be able to state requirements as a high 
level, incomplete specification, giving only essential constraints. This specification is 
then automatically refined to an (arbitrary) implementation meeting the constraints. 
Mockingbird is not limited to testing communication protocols. It has general 
application to testing domains where the test space can be described by a grammar 
and constraints. 
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the methodology we 
developed to deal with the problems of testing communication protocols. Section 3 
outlines the intended semantics and use of test message generation, and Section 4 
explains why CLP is a superior medium for dealing with issues in generation. 
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Section 5 covers, in some detail, the implementation of our approach. Section 6 then 
briefly reviews the testing problems that arise in dealing with a message filter and 
describes the use of Mockingbird in testing a production message filter. Finally, 
Section 7 reviews our progress to date and points out several promising research 
areas. 
2. METHODOLOGY 
All testing is predicated on the existence of an oracle, a standard for deciding the 
outcome of a test. Our methodology not only provides an oracle, in the form of an 
executable specification, but also provides mechanisms for systematically generating 
test messages from the same specification. The discussion below will focus on 
message protocol testing, with messages as the objects of interest. 
Mockingbird works from an initial grammatical specification of a system. This 
specification is transformed to executable versions that can be used for specific 
testing tasks. The methodology works entirely from a single specification, thereby 
avoiding consistency problems among different versions. 
For example, a specification of a message protocol can be converted to programs 
that 
generate messages that are valid under the protocol, 
generate messages with syntax errors, 
generate well-formed messages with error-seeded fields, 
decide if a given message should be accepted by the protocol, and 
conduct a search through the space of structural message variations, concentrat- 
ing on forms likely to confuse the protocol. 
A Mockingbird specification has two parts, (G, C), where G is a context-free 
message grammar and C is a constraint system. G and C describe the syntactic and 
semantic characteristics of a message, respectively. A validator for (G, C) accepts a 
message if and only if its structure conforms to the grammar G and the contents of 
the message satisfy the constraints of C. Validators are parsers (acceptors) for a 
message family. A generator for (G, C) produces test messages for input to the 
system under test. Typically generators can produce an entire family of test 
messages, the size of the family depending largely on the specificity of the constraint 
system C. Several examples of Mockingbird specifications are given in Section 3. 
A testing policy is a strategy designed to expose particular classes of errors in a 
system [20,33]. It operates by constraining the inputs of the system under test in a 
way that gives reasonable assurance the errors will come to light if they are present. 
Therefore, it seems perspicuous to formulate testing policies explicitly as constraint 
systems, where the constraints should specify only those input values and relation- 
ships that matter. 
It is important to manipulate grammars and constraints independently. The 
separation of grammars from constraints corresponds to the division between syntax 
and semantics. The grammar may be changed, for example, to generate syntactically 
ill-formed messages. Since in Mockingbird testing policies manifest themselves as 
constraint systems, the specification must support the easy substitution of one 
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constraint system for another. Many circumstances may lead to a shift in content or 
the wholesale replacement of a constraint system, for example, 
a complete change in testing strategy; 
the change in testing needs over the life cycle of the implementation, say, the 
move from component testing to integration testing; 
a narrowing of the testing strategy to focus on a particular software component; 
or 
using the specification to categorize classes of message traffic. 
Mockingbird separates the grammar from the constraints in the pair (G, C). This 
separation permits successive application of multiple testing policies in the same 
structural framework. The tester has two degrees of freedom, syntax and semantics, 
which can be freely broken apart and recombined without prejudice. 
A specification (G, C) is executable. When run in one direction, it acts as a 
validator, and when run in the opposite direction, it acts as a generator. While the 
use of grammatical specifications as validators (acceptors) is well understood, their 
use as generators is less familiar. 
Important issues in the execution of generators will be discussed later. The key 
concept of Mockingbird is that the testing policy is reflected as a set of grammars 
and constraint systems. The correct behavior of the system under test is given by a 
single fixed (G, C). The elements of this pair can be independently modified to 
produce a desired set of tests. These tests can be valid or invalid input to the system 
under test. 
For example, a constraint system C can be tuned by the test designer to produce, 
in concert with a grammar G, a family F of test messages whose members share 
common structural or semantic characteristics. These characteristics are chosen by 
the test designer as the means of illuminating the performance of the system under 
test. The combined specification, (G, C), when run as a generator, produces the 
members of this family F. Since the message generation process is automatic beyond 
the initial specification of a single fixed grammar G and the subsequent choice of a 
matching constraint system C, a tester can cheaply generate large quantities of high 
quality tests with strictly controlled properties. 
In the following section, we describe the notation for Mockingbird specifications 
and their declarative semantics. We then introduce their operational semantics via 
constraint logic programming, and finally investigate how validators and generators 
derived from these specifications are executed. 
3. MESSAGE ACCEPTANCE AND GENERATION 
Informally, a message grammar G is a context-free grammar over the domain of bit 
strings, (0, l}*. Associated with each production rule are zero or more constraints, 
each a linear inequality over the domain of integers. These inequalities form the 
constraint system, C. The specification, (G, C), is an attribute grammar with the 
constraints as the “semantics.” Attribute grammars [24] are a formalism for assign- 
ing semantic values to the nodes of derivation trees of context-free grammars. Their 
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TABLE 1. Specification for one bit messages 
; 
separation of syntax and semantics agrees with the requirement to separate the 
grammar G from its constraints C for independent manipulation. 
In this section, we provide examples of Mockingbird specifications and explain 
the semantics of message acceptance and generation. Section 4 discusses the close 
relationship between attribute grammars and Horn clause logic. We show that CLP 
is a nearly ideal medium for the expression of the Mockingbird semantics. Section 5 
is a more detailed view of the implementation. 
We informally define our specification language. For every nonterminal symbol 
X of the grammar G, there is a finite (possibly empty) set of attributes, denoted 
A(X). The attribute names A(X) and the nonterminals of G may overlap. Given 
the production rule 
&J-x,,..., x,, 
the variables in the equations associated with this rule are a subset of U:=,A( X,). 
If A( X,) n A( X,) # 0, i #j, they are disambiguated, if necessary, by prefixing the 
attribute, say a, in the manner X,.a or xj_u_ Multiple instances of the same 
nonterminal within a production are distinguished by supplementary marks such as 
integer subscripts. For example, N1 and N2 represent the same nonterminal N, and 
N,.a and N,.a represent the attribute u for N1 and N2, respectively. Finally, in our 
examples of specifications, the production rules of the grammar G are written on the 
left, and the corresponding equations cf the constraint system C on the right. Table 
1, a trivial specification, describes the set of all one bit messages where the 
constraints assign a semantic value to each rule. 
We interpret bit strings as unsigned integers. In Table 2, the specification defines 
that interpretation for any fixed n 2 0. The notation [ ] denotes the empty string. 
TABLE 2. Specification for unsigned binary integers 
s --t integer. width = integer.width = PI 
s = integer 
integer + [ 1. integer = 0 
width = 0 
scale = 1 
integer,, * bit. integer,. width = integer,.width + 1 
scale = 2 X integer, scale 
bit --t 0. 
bit 4 1. 
integer,, = bit X integer, scale + integer, 
bit = 0 
bit = 1 
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TABLE 3. Specification for toy datagram 
datagram + header, octets. headerlength = octets.length + 8 
header + source, 
destination, 
length, 
checksum. 
0 < source 
0 < destination 
8 5 length 5 65535 
checksum = source t destination + length 
source + S. 
I 
s.width = 16 
source = s 
destination -+ s. 
I 
s.width = 16 
destination = s 
length + s. 
I 
s.width = 16 
length = s 
checksum --) S. 
I 
s.width = 16 
checksum = s 
octets + [ 1. I length = 0 
octets<, + octet, octets,. 
octet -+ s. 
length = octets,.length + 1 
s.width = 8 
octet = s 
Note that the equation 
width = integer.width = n 
associated with the starting production acts a constraint forcing the specification to 
reject all bit strings that are not precisely n bits long. The same specification can 
also be used as a generator by constructing a derivation tree of G decorated with the 
constraints of C. This specification will nondeterministically generate all possible n 
bit strings. 
Table 3 is a specification for a toy datagram protocol. Each datagram consists of 
a header followed by zero or more data octets.’ The header contains four fields: 
source and destination network addresses, the total length in octets of the header 
and data portion, and a checksum. The nonterminal s appearing in Table 3 is the 
start symbol of the specification of Table 2. Running as a validator, the specification 
will accept all datagrams conforming to the syntactic and semantic constraints. As it 
stands, the specification will nondeterministically generate valid datagrams of vary- 
ing lengths. However, the constraints can be selectively changed to produce data- 
grams with particular characteristics. Some possibilities are as follows: 
Replacing the constraints 
0 < source, 
0 < destination 
‘An octef is an eight bit byte. 
A METHODOLOGY FOR TESTING 101 
with 
LY, 5 source I PI, 
(Y* 5 destination 5 & 
for some positive integers ai, LYE, pi, &, restricting the datagrams to a narrow 
range of source and destination addresses. 
Replacing the header constraint 
8 I length < 65,535 
with 
length = (Y, 
forcing all generated datagrams to be (Y octets long. The tester may choose (Y 
to be unusually small or large in an effort to break the protocol processor. 
Replacing the checksum with an illegal value to create an error-seeded datagram. 
One testing strategy is to choose a value that is off by one. A tester could 
create any number of varying length error-seeded datagrams by replacing the 
checksum constraint 
checksum = source + destination + length 
with the equation 
checksum = source + destination + length + 1 
checksum = source + destination + length - 1. 
The output of a generator is a bit stream, possibly containing holes. Each hole is 
an uninstantiated portion of the bit stream. The tester is then free to select, by way 
of some testing policy. fill values for the holes. In Table 3 the values for the 
individual data octets in a datagram are constrained only by their width, eight bits. 
The testing policy may assign values to these elements at random or perhaps choose 
a fixed sequence d,, d,, . . . that meets some testing need. 
The constraint system of specification (G, C) restricts the form and content of 
the bit stream produced by the generator for (G, C). The testing policy assigns final 
values to any remaining holes in the bit stream. Even a random selection of values 
will exhibit variations likely to expose errors [ll]. The separation of syntax (gram- 
mars) from the semantics (constraints) gives a tester unusual power and flexibility in 
crafting test cases that meet specific structural or semantic requirements. In Section 
5, we return to the issues of generation from specifications and show how constraint 
resolution and nondeterministic choice can be efficiently implemented. 
4. EXECUTION OF MOCKINGBIRD SPECIFICATIONS 
Messages can be easily specified and manipulated in the formalism of Mockingbird. 
This section addresses the problem of executing the specification. The direct 
execution of a formal specification facilitates debugging of the specification and 
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eliminates the need to verify the correspondence between the specification and a 
program that implements it. 
Direct execution does not preclude the transformation of the specification into a 
more amenable form. However, the transformation must preserve the semantics of 
the specification. Implementation issues must also be considered. For example, 
protocol test suites may require thousands of test cases for adequate coverage. 
Generators must be able to produce test suites of this size in a reasonable amount of 
time. 
A Mockingbird specification, written as an attribute grammar, is transformed to 
a definite clause logic program. This provides the specification with a well-defined 
declarative semantics and a corresponding operational semantics. The equivalence 
of attribute grammars and definite clause logic programs has been shown [9], and a 
simple syntactic transformation changes an attribute grammar into an equivalent 
logic program [l]. Consequently, a Mockingbird specification may be directly 
interpreted as a logic program [6,30]. 
Davis [7] argues that Horn clauses are a superior specification medium. A 
Mockingbird specification and its executable form are identical in structure and 
similar in syntax. This facilitates debugging the specification. The importance of this 
should not be underestimated: our experience shows that a complex specification 
with about 350 productions can be written and debugged in about two weeks. Errors 
are easily traced back to their cause in the specification. 
A single specification is central to our testing methodology. We ensure that a 
specification can be used as a validator and generator by requiring the execution of 
the specification to be reversible. Using the notation from [26], we define a reversible 
execution procedure. 
Dejinition 1. Let P be a logic program, G be a goal with only variables for 
arguments, and 8 be a correct answer substitution for P and G. Also let E be a 
SLD-refutation procedure with selection rule R. We say that P and G are 
reversible with respect to (E, R) if and only if for any u c 8 there exists an 
(E, R)-computed substitution 8’ for Ga such that (Gu)~’ = GB. 
Not all (executions of) PROLOG programs are reversible. 
For any Mockingbird specification, there is an equivalent logic program. The goal 
for this program will always be a single predicate of arity one when this program is 
used as a Mockingbird validator or generator. This predicate is satisfied by any 
input that meets the Mockingbird specification. The logic program acts as a 
validator when invoked with this argument instantiated to the contents of a 
message; it operates as a generator when invoked with an uninstantiated variable as 
its argument. We say a specification is well formed if it generates at least one finite 
message. The reversibility of logic programs ensures that a well-formed specification 
will be executable as a validator or a generator. 
Efficient implementation techniques for logic programming languages are known 
[38,39]. Unfortunately, these implementations sacrifice semantic purity for speed. 
For example, completeness is sacrificed to accommodate a more economical control 
mechanism. Some intrinsic (built-in) predicates lack completely declarative mean- 
ings because they are undefined if certain arguments are uninstantiated. Thus, in 
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practice not all implementations of logic programs are reversible. Reversibility 
depends on two conditions: 
(1) 
(2) 
All of the predicates occurring in the program must be interpretable as 
relations, that is, expressible as logical consequences of a suitable set of 
axioms. This includes all intrinsic, or built-in, predicates used by the pro- 
gram. 
Clauses must be selected by a fair search policy. This ensures that if a 
solution does exist, it will be found. 
Unfortunately, PROLOG violates both conditions: 
(1) Many system predicates require specific instantiation patterns, with arith- 
metic evaluation invoked by the i s predicate being a prime offender. 
(2) A depth first search policy is unfair. PROLOG is characterized by such a 
search policy and by a left to right selection rule that expands subgoals in the 
order they occur in a rule body. 
These deviations from the declarative semantics lead to nonreversible programs. 
Nondeclarative predicates may cause runtime exceptions,* and depth first search 
may cause infinite recursion. 
Issues of search strategy will be discussed in Section 5, where we meet condition 
(2) and demonstrate a simple technique to prevent infinite recursion. Of all the 
built-in predicates, only arithmetic is required for the execution of a Mockingbird 
specification. The remainder of this section describes techniques by which condition 
(1) can be met for arithmetic predicates. 
4.1. Declarative Arithmetic Operations 
PROLOG separates arithmetic operations into two classes, tests and assignment. A 
test compares two arbitrary arithmetic expressions. However, both expressions must 
be ground at the time of execution, and no variables can be instantiated during a 
test. An assignment performs an arithmetic computation. 
The left hand side of the assignment must be an uninstantiated variable or a 
number, and the right hand side must be a ground arithmetic expression. Restric- 
tions in structure and instantiation of arguments in arithmetic predicates present 
difficulties when executing a specification in reverse. 
Several proposals have been made for handling arithmetic operations in a more 
logically consistent manner. The simplest solution is to compensate for the direc- 
tional arithmetic when writing the specification. While used in the first implementa- 
tion of Mockingbird, this approach complicates the specifications, making them 
harder to write and understand. The current implementation of Mockingbird, 
described here, was a result of trying to eliminate directional arithmetic constraints. 
Another approach is to delay the evaluation of arithmetic operations until a 
unique value can be determined [29]. This technique is used by the p 1 us predicate 
in MU-PROLOG. Similar results are obtained by a method given by Shoham and 
*For the purposes of Definition 1, nmtime exceptions are considered to be failures. 
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McDermott [36]. They suggest using a right to left computation rule and allowing 
arithmetic predicates to succeed if any two out of the three arguments are ground. 
However, no amount of delaying will solve 
answer(V,Z)+b(3-V,Z,2),b(V,Z,3). 
b(V,Z,R)+ YisZ*R. 
even though a solution exists. 
Kornfeld [25] has proposed extending unification with semantic equality. In 
PROLOG-with-Equality, a set of equality axioms are specified. These axioms are in 
the form of a set of Horn clauses. If normal syntactic unification fails, a refutation 
proof of the equality predicate is attempted. If this succeeds, then the unification 
succeeds. Kornfeld also shows how partially specified objects can be maintained 
through the introduction of a structure he calls an omega term. omega terms can 
represent arithmetic expressions that are not yet sufficiently constrained to yield a 
single value. 
4.2. Constraint Logic Programming 
Mockingbird semantics are based on a more general formal model than that used by 
logic programs. CLP [21] is a model for a logic programming language based on the 
solvability of sets of constraints. Logic programming’s equality theory and unifica- 
tion procedure are replaced by a more general constraint theory and constraint 
satisfaction procedure. 
A CLP program, like any other logic program, consists of a set of Horn clauses. 
However, a subset of predicates in the program is designated as constraints. In 
Mockingbird a constraint is designated by a predicate symbol from the set { I , 
<, = , 2 , > >. Constraints are interpreted directly over their intended domain, 
called the algebraic domain. The meaning of operations over this domain is the 
algebraic semantics. There is no need to express the semantics of the algebraic 
domain through additional program clauses or a separate equality theory, since 
constraint satisfaction can be determined implicitly via a general constraint satisfac- 
tion procedure. With a suitably powerful procedure even programs such as the 
answer( V, I) example above can be solved. 
Operationally, CLP is much like ordinary logic programming: clauses are selected 
and reduced by SLD resolution. While execution of a logic program produces a set 
of variable bindings, CLP produces a system of constraints. Thus in CLP, variable 
bindings are replaced by constraints. As in SLD resolution, a computation rule 
selects the next subgoal for reduction. However, if the subgoal selected is a 
constraint, a constraint solver determines the satisfiability of the constraint and the 
existing constraint system. If the pair is satisfiable, the constraint is added to the 
current system of constraints, and execution continues. Otherwise, failure occurs, 
and execution continues at the next alternative. 
The constraint solver generalizes unification. Variable bindings are replaced by a 
set of constraints. A solution to the constraint system corresponds to a correct 
answer substitution. The binding of a variable is determined by all of the con- 
straints referencing that variable. In CLP the order of evaluation of numeric 
predicates is irrelevant, since solvability is a property of the whole constraint system 
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and not of the specific variable values. Note that CLP can still be implemented 
using an unfair search procedure such as depth first search [23]. In such an 
implementation, the nonterminating execution of a CLP program equivalent to a 
well-formed Mockingbird specification is still possible. 
CLP has a well-defined operational and declarative semantics [22]. The domain 
of interpretation for Mockingbird is bit strings, represented as unsigned integers. 
The equivalences between grammars and logic programs apply equally well to CLP. 
datagram(In, Out) :- 
Length0 = Length1 + 8, 
header(In, Outl, LengthO). 
octets(Out1, Out, Lengthi). 
header(In, Out, Length) :- 
0 < Source, 
0 < Destination, 
8 <= Length, 
Length <= 65636, 
FIGURE 1. CLP translation 
of toy datagram. 
Checksum = Source + Destination + Length, 
rource(In, Outl, Source), 
deatination(Out1, Out2, Destination), 
length(Out2, 0ut3, Length), 
checksum(Out3, Out, Checksum). 
source(In, Out, Source) :- 
Width = 18, 
Source = S, 
s(In, Out, S. Width). 
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For any Mockingbird specification, there is an equivalent CLP program. This 
program is obtained via a simple syntactic transformation. The CLP equivalent of a 
portion of Table 3 is given in Figure 1. 
Thus CLP makes an ideal choice for the formal basis of Mockingbird specifica- 
tions. The problem of reversing a specification is minimized because CLP looks at 
the solvability of the whole system. The computation of arithmetic values can be 
Specification Q Compiler 
CLP cl Program. 
n CLP 
Satisfiable 
Constraint 
System 
Partial 
* Solution 4 
(B,S) . 
I 
Bit 
Stream 
I Messages I 
FIGURE 2. Message generation. 
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FIGURE 3. Message validation. 
thought of as a side effect of generalized unification. This is a much more consistent 
interpretation than given by PROLOG, making constraints an integral part of the 
semantics. CLP can be implemented with a PROLOG-like control strategy, that is, 
depth first search with left to right selection of subgoals [23]. In the next section, we 
will discuss the details of the execution of actual Mockingbird specifications. 
4.3. Clause Selection 
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the process of message validation and generation. A 
Mockingbird specification (G, C) is transformed into a CLP program. When 
executed as a validator, the program takes a message as input and determines if it is 
consistent with (G, C). Conversely, generation produces a message consistent with 
(G, C), whose exact content is determined by a testing policy. 
Using CLP as an execution mechanism solves the problem of obtaining a 
declarative interpretation for arithmetic operations. Yet its use of depth first search 
with chronological backtracking, chosen for efficiency, may result in nonreversible 
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execution. The requirement for reversible execution of Mockingbird specifications 
forces us to modify this search policy. 
CLP’s search policy is sufficient for Mockingbird specifications run as validators. 
However, during generation, CLP’s unfair method of rule selection can produce 
trivial messages or infinite recursion. Consider the example in Table 2, where the bit 
productions determine which terminal symbols appear in a generated message. 
Depth first search always favors the first production, and if n = 7 the message 
0000000 will always be generated. Even if we further constrain the final value by 
adding the equation 
a<s<p, 
the generator will always arrive at the binary encoding of IY. 
Infinite recursion is another possible manifestation of an unfair search policy. 
The following productions are taken from Example 2: 
integer -+ [ 1, 
integer, + bit, integer,. 
In this order, these productions will always produce a trivial solution of length zero. 
If the order is reversed, the productions will recurse infinitely. Termination may be 
guaranteed by placing a constraint on the maximum length of the message. An 
alternative approach to termination is to randomize the search. This approach was 
adopted by others who use grammatical descriptions [2-4,10,12,18,32]. 
A random search method is defined in the following manner. Let 
X l,o+xl.*~~~.~ xl,m*~ 
X ,, o-fx~.,~...~ xn m 
1 n 
be an ordered set of all production rules whose left hand side is X. Let q be a 
random variable whose values range over the set of permutations of 1,. . . , n. Assign 
a probability distribution to q s&h that P{q = 4:) = pi, Cp, = 1, 
specific clause ordering may have probability zero. 
When a production for the nonterminal X is invoked, an instance 
of q is chosen. The first rule applied is 
X r,,o-+ X?.,,i,...r Xr,,m . ‘1 
On backtracking, the alternative rules are selected in the order 
X ~2,0+XT*,1’...’ X?* 1 mr2’ 
and p, 2 0. A 
Assume that the productions for integer listed above are labeled in textual order. 
A random ordering for these clauses can be defined: 
P{q = (1,2)} = 0.3, 
P{q = (2,l)) = 0.7. 
(1) 
If we expunge the length equations from Table 2 and augment the generator with 
the distribution (1) above, then the specification defines a generator for bit strings 
with an average length of seven. The probability of generating a string of length n is 
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0.7”. If the same distribution is defined for the bit productions of Table 2, the 
generated string will contain an average of six zeros. 
Random rule selection can help ensure that the generation process terminates 
with a nontrivial solution to the constraint system. Mockingbird leaves the selection 
of appropriate random predicates to the test designer. 
The random execution of all productions in a specification would severely 
degrade the performance of a generator. Therefore, Mockingbird allows specijk 
predicates to be declared random. The declaration also defines the probability 
distribution of that predicate. Declaring a predicate as random indicates that the 
clause ordering, normally fixed, will be decided probabilistically with each invoca- 
tion of the predicate. 
Random rule selection is both a tuning feature and a method of guaranteeing 
termination. It allows the message structure to vary probabilistically, and in this 
way, messages of the same type but varying structure may be generated without 
changing the specification. Potential variations include, but are not limited to, the 
content, length, or structure of a message. Termination can be guaranteed by the 
proper assignment of probabilities. For the test engineer, random rule selection 
offers an additional degree of variability or tuning. 
5. PRAGMATICS OF EXECUTION 
Messages are bit streams. During validation, bits are removed and terminals are 
unified with a portion of the bit stream. The length of the terminal, in bits, may be 
constant or calculated from a set of constraint equations. Constraints on a terminal 
symbol may be specified before the value of the terminal is known. Terminal 
symbols are accepted only if their value is consistent with that of existing con- 
straints. 
If a message is being generated, terminals are written to the bit stream. If the 
constraint system specifies the value of a terminal exactly, that value is written to 
the bit stream. However, a terminal’s value may be a still unsolved variable in the 
constraint system or have many allowable values. 
In this case, the value of the terminal is represented in the bit stream by a hole. A 
hole has two parts: the name of the terminal and its width in bits. For example, 
[l,O, l,O, hole(X, width(4)), . . .] denotes a bit stream with a hole representing the 
value of a terminal X, whose width is four bits. The value of the unknown terminal 
is left undetermined because the constraints associated with the terminal may not 
yet yield an exact solution or no exact solution may be possible. If there is no exact 
solution, the final choice for a value is left to the testing policy. 
Terminal operations are interpreted in a declarative manner, regardless of whether 
a message is being validated or generated. In Mockingbird, the consumption and 
output of terminals are performed by a generalization of the connects predicate 
defined by Pereira and Warren [30]. 
5.1. Constraint Satisfaction 
The execution of a Mockingbird specification (G, C) produces a set of satisfiable 
constraints, S. Each element of S is a member of C modulo variable renaming. The 
execution of a specification terminates successfully if and only if the constraint 
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system S is satisfiable. During validation, CLP constructs S to consume the 
message contents completely. If no such set of constraints can be produced, then the 
message is malformed either syntactically or semantically. 
Generation also produces a satisfiable constraint system. However, not all of the 
variables in the constraint system may have known values. For each unknown 
variable there is a corresponding hole in the bit stream. Holes represent unsolved 
variables whose values could not be exactly determined at the time the terminal was 
written. 
For example, consider the following partial specification: 
p + s s. width = 3 
01~16 
p=s 
Here s refers to the start symbol in Table 2. We treat s as a terminal in the above 
specification. 
During validation, a three bit terminal s is consumed from the bit stream. The 
terminal is accepted if its value is consistent with existing constraints of p and S 
and the constraints p = s, 0 I p I 6. 
Generation differs from validation when a terminal’s value has not been exactly 
determined by S. During generation, p’s value is unknown. A hole is placed in the 
bit stream, 
. . . , hole( p, width(3)), . . . , 
and the constraint 0 I p s 6 is added to S. 
5.2. Generating a Solution to (G, C) 
A validator for (G, C) accepts a message if and only if the entire bit stream is 
consumed and the validation leaves behind a solution to C. A message is generated 
if the generator for (G, C) can produce a bit stream B, possibly containing holes, 
and a satisfiable constraint system S. Any solution for S will fill in the holes (if any) 
of B, leaving us with a complete message that is consistent with (G, C). 
The partially instantiated bit stream B and the constraint system S are called a 
partial solution, (B, S), for the specification (G, C). (B, S) describes a set of 
solutions, each member of which conforms to (G, C). 
The partial solution (B, S) is the input to a testing policy that generates fully 
instantiated messages from a partial solution. Since a partial solution can represent 
a potentially infinite number of messages, the selection of a finite subset of messages 
is left to the testing policy. Thus the test engineer has two degrees of tuning 
freedom: random rule ordering and the testing policy. 
The testing policy aids the test engineer in generating specific messages from a 
constraint system and a partial solution. For example, the constraint system may be 
solved for external values though a constrained optimization procedure such as the 
simplex algorithm. Moreover, objective functions may be designed to generate 
solutions optimizing specific criteria. A simple enumeration of all solutions to the 
constraint system may also be produced. Messages may be generated to exploit 
suspected flaws in a communication protocol or to test specific portions of it. 
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Interactive generation is also possible, where the test engineer chooses the unknown 
hole values by hand. 
The execution of Mockingbird specifications introduces two independent tuning 
parameters. These allow control over the production of specific test messages. 
Random rule selection allows different, probabilistically derived, partial solutions to 
be generated from a single Mockingbird specification. Random rule selection varies 
the structure of a message. The testing policy produces a number of messages from 
one partial solution. The final contents of a test message are determined by the 
testing policy. The maximum number of messages generated from a partial solution 
depends on how the Mockingbird specification is constrained, that is, on the range 
of each variable in the constraint system. 
A general implementation of CLP has been described in [23]. The concepts 
described in this section have all been implemented in a Mockingbird-specific 
version of CLP. 
6. CASE STUDY 
Mockingbird was used as an approach for the problem of testing messageJilters, a 
subdomain of communication protocols. After briefly describing the function of a 
message filter, we show how one was successfully tested. 
6.1. Message Filters 
In a distributed computing environment, a machine or application that provides 
resources to the network is a server, while a machine or application that employs 
these resources is a client. Communication between server and client is based on a 
message protocol. Examples of servers include network directory servers [14], file 
servers [13], and graphics servers [35]. A server may have access to sensitive 
information, which must be protected against unauthorized disclosure, modification, 
or loss. In this case, measures must be taken to protect the integrity of the sensitive 
information. The presence of sensitive information implies the existence of at least 
two classes of users: cleared users who have a legitimate need to access the sensitive 
information, and uncleared users who have no such need. Policy dictates that 
uncleared users (clients) be denied access to sensitive information. One common 
approach is to employ a messagejilter, which acts as a protective agent for a server. 
Figure 4 illustrates the information flow through a typical message filter. An 
effective message filter must satisfy four requirements: 
(1) Every message between server and client is inspected by the filter. This 
guarantees that no transactions pass unmediated by the filter, because other- 
wise a malicious client would simply choose an unfiltered communication 
path. 
(2) No sensitive information is allowed to pass out through the filter from the 
server to an uncleared client. In the event of a breach where the server has 
mistakenly released sensitive information to an uncleared client, the filter 
causes the transaction to fail safely. The filter assumes the server itself is 
trustworthy and does not guard against a deliberate violation by the server. 
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FIGURE 4. Information flow through a typical message filter. 
(3) No ill-formed message is allowed to pass between client and server. This 
prevents a client from introducing a message that corrupts the server and, if 
the server does run amok, prevents ill-formed messages contaminated with 
sensitive data from passing outside the authorized perimeter. 
(4) All legitimate messages must pass unimpeded between the client and server. 
This guarantees that, from the point of view of both client and server, the 
filter is invisible. 
Items (l)-(3) above are access requirements, measures taken to guard against the 
release of sensitive information to uncleared clients. These requirements imply that 
the distinction between cleared and uncleared, or between sensitive and insensitive, 
is decidable from the message content. Item (4) is a service requirement, stating that 
the presence of the filter may not result in unfair denial of service to a client. 
Messages that violate the requirements are routed by the filter to a log for later 
analysis. Inspection of a message by the filter is called validation. In addition to 
validation, the filter may sanitize unused portions of a message to ensure that spare 
bits are not being used as covert channels for the transmission of sensitive informa- 
tion. 
In many cases the filter is a retrofit to an existing system that must now adhere to 
a stricter set of access requirements. The architects of the filter may be faced with 
significant additional requirements. Typically the presence of the filter must be 
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transparent to applications already in place. Economic, political, or technical 
considerations can make it impossible to change an application for the sake of the 
filter. Consequently, the message protocol between client and server must be left 
undisturbed, possibly forcing the filter to face a poorly defined protocol ill suited for 
validation. An inadequate protocol can compromise the filter’s ability to inspect 
traffic, to judge the sensitivity of information, or to detect ill-formed messages. 
Besides functional transparency, the filter must exhibit performance transparency; 
that is, the filter must not become a significant network bottleneck. This may be 
difficult to achieve if the protocol is complex, or if validation is costly. 
Given their sensitive position within a network, message filters are subject to 
accreditation, a formal certification that the filter actually satisfies the requirements 
listed earlier. Accreditation relies on a variety of methodologies and techniques, 
including secure design, program verification, critical review, and testing [19]. Each 
of these approaches increases our confidence that the filter is trustworthy, capable of 
enforcing the guidelines. Testing often plays a crucial role in establishing a sound 
basis for quantifying our degree of confidence [28,41]. 
6.2, Issues in Testing Message Filters 
Adequately testing a message filter is a nontrivial task. The testing includes 
subjecting the filter to a wide variety of both legal and illegal messages. Legal 
messages test that the filter does not deny service by rejecting legitimate traffic. 
Illegal messages test that the filter adequately protects the server. The protocols are 
often so complicated or voluminous that it is impossible to construct realistic test 
messages by hand. A single test message may be thousands of octets long, and a 
thorough testing program can easily require tens of thousands of messages. Typical 
testing strategies include 
structural testing, where gross message structure is varied in both legal and illegal 
ways; 
field testing, where the response to boundary values and corruptions of individual 
message fields is examined; 
simulation testing, where the tests model real-life message traffic; 
path testing, where the tests are designed to exercise particular execution paths 
within the filter; and 
penetration testing, where the tests are designed to force a breach. 
At the lowest level, messages are bit streams. The stream may be uniformly 
grouped into fixed width units of octets or words. Message fields are one or more 
units wide, and the individual fields are usually grouped into higher level structures. 
Test messages can be roughly characterized along two dimensions: gross structure 
(message syntax) and the contents of the message fields (message semantics). 
Our contribution to the testing of message filters is to separate these two 
characterizations (syntax and semantics), permitting the selective manipulation of 
each under the guidance of a testing policy. For even a simple protocol, the space of 
all possible messages is enormous and exhaustive testing is intractable. Hence, 
successful testing depends on a systematic search of the test space, selecting those 
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tests likely to produce significant information about the behavior of the message 
filter. 
6.3. Results of the Case Study 
A preliminary version of Mockingbird has been in use since the fall of 1985. Its 
major deficiency is that validators and generators are not produced from the same 
(G, C) pair. The current implementation, described in Section 5, corrects this 
problem. Given a message type, the common practice was to write a specification 
(G, C) for a validator and then to apply by hand a transformation to produce a 
comparable (6, c”) for the generator. A specification compiler, written in PROLOG, 
takes a specification as input and produces an equivalent C program as output. In 
effect, the specification compiler compiles a narrow subset of PROLOG into code 
for a specialized Warren abstract machine [39]. The resulting C program is then 
compiled and linked to a runtime support library. 
The message filter we tested processed several dozen different message types. The 
original message definitions, scattered throughout thousands of pages of interface 
descriptions, had been boiled down into a single reference work by the filter 
designers. The grammars and their constraint systems were written using this 
reference as a guide. Numerous ambiguities and inconsistencies were uncovered in 
the process. 
The grammars for the simplest messages comprised six production rules or less. 
The most complicated messages required over three hundred production rules and 
two hundred constraints. Depending on the complexity of the message type, it takes 
anywhere from an hour to several weeks to write a specification from a message 
definition. 
In this regimen, validators accept messages as input and produce readable listings 
as output, highlighting all message faults that would cause the filter to reject the 
message. The test listings were an important adjunct to the testing procedure. For 
example, the implementors of the filter, who had laboriously constructed a test suite 
by hand, used our validators to confirm the contents of their test messages. We also 
wrote an inuerter that accepted a test listing as input and produced the equivalent 
raw message as output. We used the inverter to build handcrafted messages that 
were beyond the reach of our automated generating technology by 
(1) creating an approximate form of the test message with a generator, 
(2) producing a listing of the message with a validator, 
(3) editing the listing by hand or with a command script, and 
(4) inverting the edited listing to produce the desired test message. 
Generators in the preliminary system accept constraint parameters as inputs and 
produce a test message that satisfies the constraints. The gross structural variations 
were controlled by the input parameters. If a field f was constrained only by a 
range, (Y < fl p, then the field was set to extreme values chosen at random. If the 
field was constrained by an enumeration, f~ { ei,. . . , e,}, then the field was set to 
an e, chosen at random. 
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Our testing concentrated on three message types. Two were operational message 
types judged by the filter implementors and applications analysts to be the most 
difficult, error-prone messages in the protocol. The third message type was specifi- 
cally designed to exercise all the basic message-processing capabilities of the filter. 
Almost all our testing was designed to force the filter to fail in some way. Valid tests 
were arranged so that they were just barely valid, in the sense that if a valid test 
were just a little larger or a trifle more complex, then it would violate some aspect of 
the message definition, and the filter would be forced to reject it. Conversely, the 
error-seeded tests were just barely erroneous, in the sense that they were wrong in 
the “smallest” possible way a message could be ill constructed. 
The bulk and complexity of the protocol made it impossible to write stressful test 
messages by hand. We conducted a Monte Carlo search of the test space constrain- 
ing the generators to produce tests with the desired properties. A typical test suite 
contained from 800 to 1000 messages divided equally among the three message 
types. The ratio between error-seeded and valid tests varied from 1 : 1 to 7 : 1, 
depending on the test objectives. The messages ranged in length from 600 to 9000 
octets. 
Each testing session uncovered errors previously undetected by other techniques, 
including code review by stepwise abstraction, extensive formal verification of 
critical components of the filter, and simulation testing using snapshots of actual 
message traffic. The filter usually failed 6 to 8% of the tests. Typical errors included 
incorrectly rejecting fields containing padding characters in unusual but legiti- 
mate positions, 
trying to read beyond the end of a message, 
incorrectly rejecting fields containing legal values, and 
failing to detect and reject messages containing out of range or ill-formatted 
fields. 
Given our large test suites, we had to face the issue of quickly analyzing the test 
results. Like Bird and Munoz [3], we automated this process to a considerable 
degree. After the tests were generated, we passed each one through a validator and 
recorded in an expectations file the expected filter response. During the testing 
sessions, the filter recorded its actions in a log. The contents of the log were 
mechanically compared with the contents of our expectations file, and any discrep- 
ancies were noted. The differences, usually a hundred or so, were then culled by 
hand. Experienced testers were able to check the results of a 1000 element test suite 
in a few days. 
One potential barrier to creating an extensive test suite is the amount of time it 
takes to generate the tests. Our experience on an otherwise unloaded DEC VAX 
11/750 was that it took 3 to 4 hours to generate a suite of 1000 tests, where each 
test averaged 1500 to 2000 octets in length. We expect the performance of the 
second generation test system to meet or exceed this figure, making it feasible to 
generate lO,OOO-element suites in a reasonable time on a dedicated workstation. 
Since a Mockingbird validator is functionally equivalent to a production filter, it 
is interesting to compare their throughput rates. Surprisingly, our benchmarks in 
this case study showed that the two were roughly comparable, and this with no 
effort to optimize on our part. This experience suggests that we can build efficient 
filters directly from specifications using the technology outlined above. We are 
116 M. GORLICK ET AL. 
experimenting with other protocol implementations to see if this is just an anomaly 
or is indicative of a general trend. Even if the specification-derived implementation 
is too slow, we suspect that its performance could be made acceptable by carefully 
hand tuning the compiled version of the specification. 
7. CONCLUSION 
This paper has described the use of logic programming in automated testing. Logic 
programming is particularly suitable for this application with its ability to support 
grammatical specifications, deferred satisfaction of constraints, and bidirectional 
execution of specifications (that is, the ability to run certain programs both 
“forwards” and “backwards”). 
While the testing of message filters was the focus, many other natural applica- 
tions in testing can benefit from these techniques. Specifically, in domains having a 
test space that can be described by a grammar and constraint system, automated 
generation of tests can be accomplished as shown here. 
There are several important general advantages of our approach: 
Executable specijcations. Specifications in Mockingbird are transformed to CLP 
programs via simple syntactic transformations. These programs are directly 
executable. In the case of message filters, the specification not only acts as a 
test oracle but also generates tests. 
Acceptance and generation. A single specification is used both for producing 
new messages and for testing the validity of existing messages. There is no 
need for parallel acceptance and generation specifications, and therefore no 
need to maintain consistency among them. This eliminates a potentially 
serious configuration management problem. A single uniform notation paves 
the way for analytic tools that suggest tests based on the form and content of 
the specification. 
Formal semantics. The advantage of using CLP as the target of this transforma- 
tion is that elegant, well-defined operational and declarative semantics are 
immediately inherited. This is not the case with some attribute grammar 
formalisms or with many protocol specification techniques. The importance of 
a formal foundation cannot be overstated in a complex environment of 
interacting constraints, where correctness is of the essence. If the production 
filter is derived directly from the specification, it may be easier to prove that 
the filter is correct. Proof of correctness may be essential if the filter is 
entrusted with sensitive information. 
Ejkiency. Mockingbird has been used successfully on a production system. An 
efficient implementation of the executable specification has been outlined. The 
prototype implementation has been used repeatedly to generate large numbers 
of high-quality tests in a few hours. The throughput of the acceptors is 
comparable to that of the filter itself, suggesting that it may be possible to 
construct a production filter directly from the specification. 
Convenience. The content of generated messages can be easily controlled, thanks 
to the expressive power of constraint-based programming. It is easy, for 
example, to manipulate the attribute grammar specification to create invalid 
messages meeting specific requirements. Not only does the tester have the 
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freedom to design tests suited to his needs, but Mockingbird can also easily be 
combined with other testing technologies. 
To our knowledge, the combined application of these advantages to testing is new. 
More generally, we feel that Mockingbird illustrates the expressive power that 
comes from specification with constraints. Many real-world phenomena are charac- 
terized by sets of constraints or restrictions that can be satisfied in a number of 
ways, whereas variations among these ways are not significant. John Hopcroft has 
talked about the example of specifying robot commands for tying a square knot in a 
piece of rope. Since only a few characteristics of the rope’s configuration are 
significant, complex specifications giving precise coordinates for each piece of the 
rope are inappropriate. To require the complete specification of all details from a 
programmer is unnecessary and undesirable. A more convenient, flexible, efficient, 
and expressive system results if specifications consist of only those things that 
matter. 
Future work on protocols and testing with Mockingbird can go in many direc- 
tions. The methodology can be applied to other protocols as well as other software 
systems. We are writing a hierarchy of executable specifications for the Internet 
Protocol. These specifications will be used to generate mechanically an extensive test 
suite for the IP portion of the Defense Data Network protocol suite [15]. More 
investigation is needed to evaluate the hypothesis that Mockingbird is a good 
approach for software testing in general. In particular, much work is needed over 
other constraint domains besides the integers, for example, finite sets. 
The work of [17] specifically refers to the reversible execution of properly 
structured PROLOG programs and their utility in protocol design validation and 
protocol conformance testing. However, [17] is restricted to that portion of a 
protocol modeled by augmented state transition grammars. Mockingbird resolves 
these issues in a general way and solves the problems of low-level message valida- 
tion and generation. Another interesting related work is the Interrogator [27], a 
PROLOG program that searches for vulnerabilities in network protocols for auto- 
matic cryptographic key distribution. This suggests that, given a suitable formal 
specification of a protocol, high-quality tests could be selected automatically. 
CLP permits much more flexible constraint handling than PROLOG, and certain 
natural classes of CLP programs (in particular, the programs resulting from Mock- 
ingbird specifications) are reversible. An intriguing area for research lies in charac- 
terizing precisely which CLP programs are reversible. 
More immediately, there is work to do in making CLP more efficient for 
special-purpose applications. The key to efficient CLP lies in restricting the fre- 
quency of calls to the constraint solver and in using the most cost-effective solvers 
available for the constraints at hand. One possibility is that a CLP program, which 
implicitly calls a general constraint solver repeatedly, can be compiled to a PROLOG 
program that explicitly calls specialized constraint solvers exactly where needed. 
This is a challenging and exciting area for future work. 
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